Griekenland: tien analyses

De onnavolgbare onderhandelingstactieken van de Grieken hebben niet alleen de Europese regeringen, maar ook de financiële markten verbijsterd achtergelaten. Hoe groot is nu de kans dat Griekenland daadwerkelijk failliet gaat en de EU verlaat? En als dat zwarte scenario een feit wordt, wat zijn dan de financiële gevolgen?

Valentijn van Nieuwenhuijzen van NN IP denkt erover wat minder risicovol te  beleggen.

"The reaction on financial markets was negative but there is no sense of panic. After an initial weak opening with the Eurostoxx 50 down by 5%, the market has started to crawl back. The same trends are visible in the bond market where the peripheral spread tightening remains limited to around 30bp. The Euro has also recovered from its lows versus the USD. This signals that investors believe a workable solution can still be found and a Grexit avoided but also that the fundamental and policy (ECB QE, OMT, bridge loans,…) environment is strong enough to deal with the current situation in Greece." 

"Given that uncertainty seems likely to linger for at least another week and markets have not declined to attractive entry points yet, we are considering tactically scaling back some active equity and bond risk."

Emiel van den Heiligenberg van Legal & General IM vreest een Grexit en eist van de partijen een definitieve oplossing.

"If Greece leaves, then we know for sure that the euro is breakable. When pushed, the core European countries will have allowed a member to leave rather than commit to unconditional fiscal transfers. Put another way, despite his 2012 promise, Draghi won’t have done whatever it takes to preserve the euro."

"So when another peripheral country gets into difficulty because of a recession or an unexpected political result, what’s to stop them also leaving the euro? More importantly for markets, what’s the motivation for investors to keep their euros in that country? This would be a very dangerous precedent."

"In the near term, the best case scenario for financial markets would be for the Greek government to back down or for the referendum to take place and result in a positive outcome for Greece agreeing to stay in the Euro and adhere to harsh austerity conditions. However, given the unsustainable debt burden, without unconditional fiscal transfers this would still be a temporary solution with the clock ticking on the next crisis. The Greek government knows this and we must give them some credit for acknowledging that the solution to their problem is not continuing to kick the can down the road."

Eugene Philalithis, portefeuillemanager multi-asset,van Fidelity Worldwide Investments rekent op een Grexit en een koopgolf op de obligatiemarkt.

“Ik acht de kans dat de Grieken ‘nee’ stemmen vrij groot nu de gebeurtenissen zich blijven ontvouwen en de datum van het referendum nadert. De propagandamachine van de regering draait op volle toeren. Als de Grieken nee stemmen krijgt de regering in feite carte blanche. En ik denk steeds vaker dat er wordt aangestuurd op een Grexit. Ik ben ook van mening dat een ’nee’ nog niet volledig is ingeprijsd in de markten. Nu het besef dat er een kans is op een 'nee' en de daarmee gepaarde gevolgen van een Grexit helder worden, denk ik dat de mogelijkheid bestaat dat beleggers zich massaal storten op veilige havens zoals staatspapier met een lange looptijd of contanten. De markten zullen dan waarschijnlijk oversold raken."

"Een ‘ja’ zal dus zeker met gejuich ontvangen worden door de markten en de beleidsmakers. Bovendien lijkt door de problemen rond Griekenland en de sterker wordende dollar een renteverhoging door de Fed in september steeds onwaarschijnlijker."

Eric Chaney van Axa IP rekent op een flinke beursreactie als de Grieken voor een nee gaan.

"Euro area partners would probably consider that the Greek people have expressed a view not consistent with Greece remaining a member of the euro. Greece would make it clear that the bonds due to the ECB won’t be paid back (at face value at least). The ECB would probably (although not immediately) consider Greece in default and Greek banks insolvent, laying the groundwork for the cancellation of ELA, which would make the banking system immediately bankrupt Capital and deposit controls would be strengthened and Grexit logistics prepared."

"In case of speculative attacks on peripheral debt (Portugal being the most vulnerable), the ECB could allow national central banks to increase their purchases of their government debt within the framework of the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). Yet, financial markets would most likely react negatively, with the euro down another 5% to 10%, as well as equity markets. Peripheral spreads are unlikely to widen dramatically beyond what is mentioned above, given the threat of ECB’s interventions."

Lucy O'Caroll van Aberdeen AM ziet besmettingsgevaren. Na een Grexit wordt de aanval ingezet op Spanje, Portugal en Italië.

"So, the risks of failure of the Greek banking sector and direct losses for private sector entities with direct exposure to Greek debt (private and public) have increased dramatically. The risks of financial market contagion have also increased sharply."

"This comes directly via Eurozone member states’ holdings of Greek debt, but also indirectly by association: Spain, because of the political vulnerabilities outlined above and high unemployment rate (including youth unemployment at 49.6%, the next-highest in the Eurozone to Greece’s 50.1%), though its GDP recovery in the past year has been impressive; Portugal, because although its economy is repairing it is doing so from a low base and with a high debt burden; and Italy, because again although it is recovering, it has the second-highest debt ratio in the Eurozone after Greece – though with a far lower unemployment rate and a stronger deficit position."

Volgens Rory Bateman van Schroders heeft een Grexit dramatische gevolgen voor Griekenland, maar blijft de ellende voor de rest van Europa beperkt.

"As we have said repeatedly, the consequences of a Greek default and the imposition of capital controls will have a dramatic effect on Greece but a limited economic bearing on the wider eurozone."

"This is a generally accepted view, but our concern from here is the medium-term impact on the broadening economic recovery taking place in Europe right now. We will not know for some time how business confidence may be influenced by the uncertainty and fears of possible contagion to other eurozone countries, particularly the periphery.
Much will depend on unknowable Greek factors such as potential social unrest and associated media coverage, Russian involvement, the depth of the recession and so on."

David Stubbs van JP Morgan AM beschouwt een stevige marktdaling als een koopaangelegenheid.

"Politics was always going to cause volatility in European assets this year. The big picture remains one of economic recovery and aggressive policy action that should support corporate earnings. Both the equity and debt of quality European companies should perform well in this environment and reward investors who stay invested. If risk assets do decline significantly over coming days, we would tend to regard that as a buying opportunity."

Giordano Lombardo van Pioneer Investments neemt alvast afscheid van Tsipras.

"We believe that the most likely result of the referendum is a “Yes” vote to the Eurozone. In that case, with a possible change in Greek political leadership, we could see an acceptance of EU conditions, new funding, an implementation of structural reforms reinforced and endorsed by Greece. Capital controls will likely be maintained for a long time. In the meantime, the role of the ECB to support the Greek banking system will be crucial. It will help to smooth the eventual transition to normality. Even in this scenario, there remains the risk that a prolonged period of uncertainty could negatively impact the confidence in the Eurozone, weakening the current positive momentum."

Mark Burgess van Columbia Threadneedle blijft positief over de belegingskansen in noordelijk Europa.

"In fixed income, we have maintained a cautious stance on peripheral bonds through Q2, feeling that the risk of contagion is under-priced. In a disorderly exit scenario, we feel that Italian spreads should trade wider than 200bps versus German Bunds as a greater risk premium is required. Over the medium-term however, peripheral bonds should remain supported by, above all, ECB support, preventing a return to spread levels reached in 2012. Similarly in equities we are underweight in Southern Europe and we remain cautious given the ongoing uncertainty."

"The European earnings outlook does not look immediately compromised by events in Greece, although this will depend upon the impact on consumer and business confidence and the credit channel remaining open for creditworthy borrowers in Southern Europe. So far we have little evidence to suggest that depositor confidence in other European countries is dented or that credit conditions have immediately deteriorated, and so our positive outlook for European fundamentals is unchallenged."

Steen Jacobsen van Saxo Bank ziet sterke overeenkomsten tussen Lehman toen en Griekenland nu.

"Er hangt precies hetzelfde gevoel in de lucht als vóór het Lehman-faillissement. Ik herinner me dat ik bijna alleen stond in mijn overtuiging dat Lehman niet overeind zou blijven; zowel de markt als de Federal Reserve bleven last-minute oplossingen zien. Lehman werd beschouwd als te ingewikkeld om te redden. Zeer weinig mensen waren bereid om de bank te helpen en vergeet niet dat Lehman al lang voor 2008 een significante premie van +100/200 bps voor one-week deposits betaalde."

"Lehman was op zijn balans 30/35x gefinancierd en de Griekse schuld is vergelijkbaar blootgesteld. Het ‘morele’ risico is ook vergelijkbaar: het komt neer op een macro-financieel kader van altijd meer tijd willen hebben, hetgeen nooit werkt. Het plan van de Fed (t.a.v. Lehman Brothers) was om meer tijd te kopen aangezien Plan A en Plan B 'wortel- en-stok'-achtige oplossiongen waren. Toen deze opbliezen, was er geen ander plan. Lehman had geen plan en Griekenland heeft ook geen plan. Geen plan hebben is geen plan en dat zien we nu gebeuren." 

"Het falen om een last-minute overeenkomst te sluiten zal de DAX met opnieuw 3 tot 5% naar beneden brengen en het kredietrisico voor nieuwe eurozone-leden zoals Hongarije, Kroatië, Bulgarije en Roemenië laten exploderen. Zelfs Polen zal tegenwind gaan voelen."